(Dis)agreement with the Implementation of Humanitarian Policy Measures Towards Asylum Seekers in Israel: Does  the Frame Matter? by Hochman, Oshrat & Hercowitz-Amir, Adi
www.ssoar.info
(Dis)agreement with the Implementation of
Humanitarian Policy Measures Towards Asylum
Seekers in Israel: Does the Frame Matter?
Hochman, Oshrat; Hercowitz-Amir, Adi
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hochman, O., & Hercowitz-Amir, A. (2017). (Dis)agreement with the Implementation of Humanitarian Policy Measures
Towards Asylum Seekers in Israel: Does the Frame Matter? Journal of international migration and integration, 18(3),
897-916. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-016-0510-0
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-58719-8
  
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in 
Journal of international migration and integration, Vol. 18, 2017, No. 3, pp. 897-916 
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-016-0510-0  
Page numbers have been adjusted to the publishers version, whereby this postprint is fully quotable. 
 
 
(Dis)agreement with the Implementation of Humanitarian Policy Measures Towards Asylum Seekers 
in Israel: Does the Frame Matter? 
Oshrat Hochman
1,2
 , Adi Hercowitz-Amir
3
 
Abstract This study investigates emerging public attitudes about the implementation of humanitarian policy 
measures towards asylum seekers among the Jewish population in Israel. It specifically asks whether the 
way asylum seekers in Israel are framed informs the process of attitude formation in the Jewish Israeli 
public. To answer this question, we measure the extent to which the frame “infiltrators” as opposed to the 
frame “asylum seekers” positively predicts the rejection of humanitarian policy measures toward asylum 
seekers. Following framing theory, we also propose that the framing effect depends on the respondents' 
perceived levels of threat by asylum seekers, and on their political identification. In line with our hypothesis, 
the findings indicate that the effect of the framing on the rejection of humanitarian policy measures 
decreases with increasing levels of threat. Although the framing effect on the rejection of humanitarian 
policy measures towards asylum seekers is somewhat weaker among respondents with a right-wing 
political identification, the differences between these and other respondents are not significant. 
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Introduction 
Due to lengthy armed conflicts, persecution and human rights violations across various troubled regions, 
claiming asylum has recently become a common form of migration from the world's periphery to Europe, 
North America, and Australia (Statham 2003). In 2015 alone, a record number of 2.0 million persons 
predominantly nationals of Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia applied for asylum around the world (UNHCR 
2016). As a result, considerable shifts have taken place, in the political, legal, bureaucratic, and social 
circumstances asylum seekers meet once arriving in their receiving countries (Hatton 2012; Crawley 2005; 
Goot and Sowerbutts 2004; Yoo and Woo-Koo 2014; Zimmermann 2011; Verkuyten 2004). Of particular 
importance in this regard are the circumstances conditioning the entry of asylum seekers, and those 
associated with their accommodation in the receiving countries. This study focuses on the circumstances of 
accommodation of asylum seekers in Israel, and specifically, on the views of the Jewish Israeli public about 
the implementation of humanitarian policy measures securing the well-being of African asylum seekers 
residing in the country. 
According to the mainstream political and public discourse in Israel, there are no asylum seekers as such in 
the country. The dominant discourse maintains rather that Israel is facing an uncontrolled flow of 
unauthorized migrants labeled “infiltrators”, posing a threat to state and society. The construction of asylum 
seekers in Israel as unauthorized infiltrators relies on three pillars: first, African asylum seekers enter Israel 
unlawfully and clandestinely through the Israeli-Egyptian land border; second, most of the African asylum 
seekers are “bogus” refugees looking for job opportunities and do not genuinely fear persecution; and third, 
the uncontrolled flow of migration from Africa will undermine the Jewish majority in Israel and 
consequentially its existence as a Jewish state (Kalir 2014). Framing the asylum seekers issue in this 
manner, policy makers paved the way for the legitimization of their exclusion: if asylum seekers are bogus, 
they do not deserve any humanitarian rights. However, even if they are genuine, given the threat they pose 
to state and society, Israel cannot afford to accommodate them. 
Every (2008) argues that humanitarianism is built upon an opposing binary between “costs to self” 
(individualism) and “duty to others” (universalism). She claims that the responsibility to care for others less 
fortunate, i.e., to be humanitarian, is limited by the degree to which this moral duty might lead to costs to 
one's interests. From this point of view, the framing of asylum seekers in Israel as a threat is predicted to 
cue respondents' pre-existing threat perceptions regarding the entry of foreigners into Israel, and increase 
their exclusionist views toward them. 
Framing theory proposes that the main mechanism determining a framing effect is the applicability of a 
given frame. It is thus worthwhile to ask who is more likely to be affected by the framing of asylum seekers 
in Israel, and why? Applicability differs between individuals based on their ability to weigh different 
considerations, and their motivation to do so (Price and Tewksbury 1997). To test these dimensions of 
applicability, we first varied the considerations individuals can apply in forming their attitudes by randomly 
exposing part of the participants in our survey to the dominant terminological frame “infiltrators”, and the rest 
to a competing frame namely, “asylum seekers”. 
Second, we investigated the role of motivation in determining whether considerations implied by an “asylum 
seekers” frame, which proposes an alternative to the dominant “infiltrators” frame, are applied. We expect 
motivation to be shaped first by  
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the levels of perceived threat respondents demonstrate: higher levels of threat will decrease the 
respondents' motivation to consider new arguments when forming their attitudes. Motivation is additionally 
predicted to be a function of the political identification of the respondents: Right-wing and religious party 
voters are predicted to show lower sensitivity to our frame manipulation, due to their predispositions, or 
because of their need to adhere to the norms of their political in-group. 
This study proposes two main contributions: first, it is among the first to study the attitudes of the Israeli 
public towards asylum seekers (see Ariely 2016; Canetti et al. 2016; Hochman 2015). And second, it is the 
first study we know of, that investigates the role of framing in emerging public attitudes about the 
implementation of humanitarian policy measures toward asylum seekers in Israel. In the next section, we 
discuss Israel's policy toward asylum seekers and the discourse on the issue. We then lay out the 
theoretical background for our hypotheses followed by the description of the data and methods used to test 
the hypotheses. Finally, we present and discuss the findings and their implications. 
The Setting: Israel and its Asylum Policy 
Israel's asylum policy must be understood within the framework of its self-definition as a Jewish-democratic 
state, embodied in the Law of Return. This law secures the right of all Jews around the world to become 
Israeli nationals and at the same time, defines Israeli nationality as an ethnic good, preserved exclusively 
for Jews. Immigration policy in Israel is thus exclusionary toward non-Jews whose presence is understood 
to challenge the ethno-national definition of the Israeli state (Raijman et al. 2008). This key trait of the Israeli 
society has a major role in the formation of policy and attitudes towards non-Jewish migrants to the country, 
labor migrants as well as asylum seekers (Kritzman-Amir 2015). 
Israel is a newcomer to the community of countries receiving asylum seekers. During the mid 2000s, Israel 
became a destination for a significant number of migrants from African states, one that resembles the flow 
of African asylum seekers arriving into Europe, the USA, and Australia. These asylum seekers arrived 
mostly through the border between Israel and Egypt, having crossed the Sinai Peninsula in their journey 
mainly from Sudan and Eritrea. Between 2003 and 2006, the number of African asylum seekers arriving into 
Israel was estimated at about 1500 a year. A dramatic increase in the numbers of entries occurred in 2007 
with some 5000 African asylum seekers entering during that year. Flows reached their peak between the 
years 2010-2012 with some 10,000 individuals arriving during 2010 and some 17,000 individuals arriving 
during 2011 (Population and Immigration Authority 2016). From 2012 onwards, the flow of asylum seekers 
into Israel came virtually to a halt and the number of individuals entering since is estimated at less than a 
few dozen a year.
1
 Currently, Israel hosts some 41,000 African asylum seekers which are a very small 
minority accounting for0.6 % of the Israeli population (Population and Immigration Authority 2016).  
                                                        
1 The dramatic decrease in entries is presumed to be associated with the erection of a wall on the Israeli-Egyptian 
border by the Israeli government and the highly restrictive asylum legislation passed by the Israeli parliament. It might 
also have to do with Egypt's military interventions in the Sinai Peninsula. 
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Israel's asylum policy has undergone several changes over the years. Caught unprepared for the inflow of 
asylum seekers from Africa, Israeli policymakers reacted to it, in the early years, in a chaotic (Afeef 2009) 
and ambivalent (Paz 2011) way. One decision made in these early years was to grant African asylum 
seekers from Sudan and Eritrea a temporary group protection status (TGP), which they still hold to date. 
This status provides asylum seekers with immunity against deportation, in line with the principle of non-
refoulement endorsed by the Refugee Convention of 1951 Israel has signed, yet it does not offer any socio-
economic rights.
2
 Several such rights were secured during 2007 and 2008 with a few gestures of good will, 
which never crystalized into a coherent policy. These gestures were instead postulated as exceptional 
humanitarian actions taken by the authorities. For example, in 2007, some 2000 Eritrean asylum seekers 
were granted temporary working visas (Yaron et al. 2013) based solely on their date of entrance to Israel. 
During the same year, following a multi-party petition signed by Israeli MPs opposing the deportation of 
Darfuris, the Israeli prime-minister Ehud Olmert granted asylum to 498 Darfuris without an individual 
screening process (Duman 2015). Calls for the protection of the rights of asylum seekers were also voiced 
by military reserve soldiers who often made the first contact with the African asylum seekers at the border 
(Bereshkovsky 2007). 
With the dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving at the Israeli border with Egypt, the 
ambiguities in Israel's asylum policy disappeared and a strict exclusionist policy emerged. Thus, in 2010, a 
government directive was initiated initiating the construction of a fence at the border and a detention facility 
which will accommodate asylum seekers upon their arrival into Israel, as well as asylum seekers already 
residing in the country. 
Israel's exclusionist policy toward asylum seekers is best exemplified through the very low rates of 
recognized refugees it holds namely, less than 1 % (Kritzman-Amir 2015). These exceptionally low 
recognition rates can be accounted for by the fact that until 2013, most persons protected by a TGP status 
in Israel were not permitted to submit individual asylum applications. Therefore, almost 90 % of asylum 
seekers in Israel have not had their individual cases heard, nor have they gone through the Refugee Status 
Determination process (RSD) by this time (Berman 2012; Natan 2012).
3
 Due to the fact that de-facto, the 
refugee status exists in Israel to a very minor extent, the UNHCR (United Nations Human Rights 
Commission) considers most of the African asylum seekers in Israel to be “individuals in a refugee like 
situation” (UNHCR 2014). 
The exclusionist asylum seekers policy in Israel was sustained in 2012 with the amendment of the 
infiltration prevention law. The infiltration prevention law was passed during the 1950s, to secure Israel's 
right to protect itself and take severe measures against individuals from enemy states entering Israel 
unlawfully in order to commit terrorist attacks (Yaron et al. 2013). The amendment of the law authorized the  
                                                        
2 In the case of the Sudanese, the protection was given based on the fact that these individuals arrived from an enemy 
state and could not be returned home due to lack of diplomatic relations. 
3 This reality of low recognition rates in Israel serves as a basis for contrasting claim-making: those who argue that the 
low rates confirm the applicants' weak grounds for requesting refugee status, and those who contend that the low rates 
are mere proof of the unfairness of the RSD procedure in Israel (Berman 2012). 
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state to treat asylum seekers as infiltrators, and above all, to detain them for lengthy periods without a clear 
cause.
4
 
The discourse on asylum seekers in Israel took the same path as the policy (Paz 2011). It is currently 
governed by the spread of fear from threats they pose to state and society (e.g., Goldstein 2010; Kalir 
2014). In this study, we aim to test whether the exclusionist policy and discourse on infiltrators in Israel can 
be challenged by means of exposure to a competing frame namely, that of asylum seekers seeking refuge 
from political persecution and war. Specifically, we seek to understand whether exposure to the competing 
frame undermines the general tendency of the Jewish Israeli public to exclude asylum seekers and reject 
the position that Israel is responsible for their wellbeing. 
Humanitarianism and Asylum Policy 
Humanitarianism is relevant for the current study both from a macro-political and from a micro-individual 
perspective. At the policy level, humanitarianism represents one of two logics on which asylum policies 
typically rely. The other logic is one of state-sovereignty (Joppke 1997). The relations between the 
humanitarian and the state-sovereignty logics are considered in the literature to be highly unbalanced. 
Pickering (2001) for example argues that the language of humanitarianism tends to present asylum seekers 
and refugees as submissive objects, and that humanitarian principles are understood by host states as a 
form of “charity-giving” (see also Grove and Zwi 2006; Dauvergne 1999) and not a standard of obligation. 
These and other authors maintain that this construction of humanitarianism places the host state in the 
privileged position of the benefactor and the asylum seeker in the disadvantaged position of the beneficiary 
(Dauvergne 1999, 2000, 2005; Taylor 2001). 
Gibney (2004) proposes that this imbalance between the humanitarian and the state-sovereignty logics, 
positively establishes asylum policies as “realistic” in setting a minimal yet clear standard for liberal states' 
responsibilities towards asylum seekers and refugees. He claims that humanitarianism is attentive to the 
modern state's agency to ensure citizens' welfare and security, is flexible enough to apply in different states, 
and is cautious in the demands it makes of states, requiring them to accept new entrants to the point where 
certain (minor) costs are incurred (Gibney 2004).
5
 
More central for the context of our current study is however the individual meaning of humanitarianism that 
aims to explain its role in public attitudes towards the allocation of resources to others. In this context, the 
literature proposes to view humanitarianism as a personal value and, as such, consider its role in the 
formation of attitudes (Feldman and Steenbergen-Marco 2001; Pantoja 2006). Psychologists  
                                                        
4 Originally, the Infiltration Prevention law stated that asylum seekers are to be detained for at least 36 months. Since 
then, the law was amended three times by the Knesset, following human rights organizations' appeals to the Israeli 
Supreme Court. As of August 2015, the detention period was reduced by the court to 20 months. 
5 Importantly, Gibney (2004) additionally maintains that states have the duty not just to accept refugees when the costs 
of doing so are low, but also to reshape the political space in a way that the amount of protection provided for refugees 
at low cost will be maximized. This is achieved by restructuring public policy, participating in burden sharing initiatives 
between states, and dealing with the original causes of forced migration (see also Dauvergne 1999, 2000, 2005; Taylor 
2001; Every 2008). 
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consider humanitarianism to be one variant of moral values, tapping to prosocial orientations (Schwartz 
2007; Staub 1989). As such, humanitarianism implies a sense of responsibility for others, and a need to be 
personally involved in solving the problems of others (Feldman and Steenbergen-Marco 2001). 
Humanitarianism is associated with a sense of compassion (Nussbaum 1996), and is based on civic 
humanism, social responsibility, and similar philanthropic and humane codes of conduct (Berkowitz and 
Lutterman 1968; Bobo 1991; Herzog 2009). 
Supporting these characteristics of humanitarianism, empirical findings indicate that humanitarian attitudes 
are associated with positive feelings towards immigrants and low support for exclusion (see e.g., Oyamot et 
al. 2012; Pantoja 2006). In the current study, we wish to investigate whether or not the Israeli public 
supports the current policy toward asylum seekers, and rejects a more humanitarian policy. More specifi-
cally, we examine whether framing asylum seekers as “infiltrators” fosters support in the current policy, and 
whether the rejection of humanitarian policy measures can be reduced by referring to these individuals as 
“asylum seekers” instead. 
Framing and Public Attitudes 
The words, images, phrases, and presentation styles elites use to construct specific issues in the public 
discourse represent “frames” which take part in the formation of individual attitudes and behaviors (e.g., 
Schuck 2006; Zaller 1992). The effect of frames on the formation of individual attitudes is known in the 
literature as a “framing effect.” Framing effects do not change individuals' values or beliefs. Instead, they 
determine which considerations individuals reflect on when forming an attitude. Specifically, framing an 
issue in a particular way cues preexisting cognitions individuals hold, and, if successful makes these 
cognitions relevant for individuals in considering a specific issue and their attitudes regarding it. A framing 
effect emerges when some considerations regarding the issue at hand are made available, accessible, and 
applicable (Chong and Druckman 2007). 
Price and Tewksbury (1997) explain that availability depends on the ability of individuals to understand the 
meaning of a specific consideration and its significance. Availability increases as exposure to the 
consideration increases. Accessibility also depends on the frequency with which the consideration is 
brought into mind or in other words, on the frequency of exposure to frames which are linked with this 
consideration. Applicability depends on subjective evaluations of individuals about the relevance and 
importance of the consideration for the issue compared with other available considerations (Price and 
Tewksbury 1997). Gamson (1992) points out in this regard that not all individuals exposed to a frame 
respond to it in the same way (see also Brewer 2001; Knoll et al. 2011). 
Whether a consideration is applicable or not, depends on different factors. Price and Tewksbury (1997) 
stress the importance of ability and motivation. In terms of ability, the main question is whether individuals 
can counter the dominant frame with their own interpretation of the issue at hand. This ability depends on 
knowledge and political involvement but also on individuals' momentary level of concentration or distraction. 
In terms of motivation, the main question is whether individuals are motivated to engage in this evaluation 
process or not.  
  
903 
 
Research indicates that framing effects are especially successful if adhering to “news values”, that is, issues 
that are of particular interest for the press like group conflict, drama, and personalities (Wolfsfeld et al. 
2000). Immigration perfectly matches such “news values” because of the attractiveness of a group conflict 
frame to describe it (Augoustinos and Quinn 2003; Knoll et al. 2011). Framed in this way, immigration is 
thus a very popular news story. Framing immigrants as out-group members, the media as well as other 
elites invoke in-group identifications in the public. According to the social identity perspective (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986), once in-group identifications are salient, in-group favoritism and out-group exclusion as well 
as positive (in-group) and negative (out-group) stereotyping will follow. 
Reflecting on the Israeli setting, the group conflict frame appears to be applicable. Using the label 
“infiltrators”, politicians and the media successfully framed the African asylum seekers as an out-group 
posing a major security threat (Kritzman-Amir and Shumacher 2012; Tsurkov 2012) and produced specific 
stereotypes to apply on members of this group. Interestingly, alternative frames which were also voiced in 
the Israeli political and public discourse like refugees, or asylum seekers, were rejected. For policy makers, 
these latter frames were counterproductive in their efforts to implement a highly exclusionist policy. For the 
media, these frames represented a deviation from the group conflict frame. 
Exposed to the frame “asylum seekers”, some of the respondents in our study are likely to have higher 
ability to process alternative considerations when forming their attitudes on policy issues related to this 
group. Due to the fact that this frame too is voiced in the public discourse, we assume that the 
considerations associated with it are available and accessible for these respondents. As mentioned before, 
applicability depends not only on ability, but also on motivation. To test the motivation argument and its role 
in the applicability of the frames, we refer to the respondents' levels of perceived threat and to their political 
identification. 
Costs to Self: Perceived Threat and Support for Humanitarian Policy Practices 
A substantial number of studies examined the sources of xenophobia, hostility, prejudice, and discriminatory 
attitudes towards migrants and ethnic minorities (e.g., Ariely 2011; Hochman 2015; Murray and Marx 2013; 
Semyonov et al. 2006). Two of the 
most popular explanations for the formation and level of anti-immigrant sentiment are the competition or 
realistic group threat perspective, and the symbolic threat perspective. The former stresses the impact of 
material competition on ethnic antagonism (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; LeVine 
and Campbell 1972; Quillian 1995; Raijman and Semyonov 2004; Scheepers et al. 2002) the latter 
suggests that the roots of hostility are linked to symbolic (cultural, national) preferences (e.g., Esses et al. 
2001; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Scheepers et al. 2002). Both explanations imply a commitment to 
protect the particularistic interests of the in-group. 
The literature proposes two ways to conceptualize the relations between the competition, or conflict 
perspective and the symbolic threat perspective. One is the integrated threat theory (Stephan and Stephan 
2000) that suggests to view each perspective as a separate dimension within a higher order concept of 
threat. The other is the ethnic  
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competition perspective according to which perceived threat (or competition) intensifies processes of social 
identification or counter-identification that lead to the emergence of negative attitudes towards out-groups 
(Savelkoul et al. 2010). This latter perspective also proposes that material competition and symbolic threat 
should be understood as one and the same mechanism (Scheepers et al. 2002). In the current paper, we 
adopt the latter of these two perspectives. 
Framing and Political Identification: A Social Identity Perspective 
Political identification is also predicted to affect the respondents' motivation to apply alternative 
considerations (e.g., Knoll et al. 2011). The association between right-wing political identification and the 
applicability of the dominant frame regarding asylum seekers in Israel is particularly relevant given the fact 
that the exclusionist policy was initiated and implemented by a center-right government (Duman 2014). 
Theoretically, the association between political identification and attitudes relies on assertions made within 
the social identity perspective. Specifically, Hogg and Reid (2006) maintain that individuals need to 
demonstrate in-group prototypical behavior in order to sustain their in-group identification. This implies that 
people in salient groups pay close attention to information delineating the prototypical behavior of their 
group members. We therefore contend that respondents holding a right-wing political identification will be 
more motivated to adopt the dominant frame and less willing to engage in alternative considerations 
compared with individuals holding a different political identification. Based on the theoretical discussion 
above, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1 Rejection of humanitarian policy measures toward asylum seekers will be 
weaker among respondents exposed to the frame “asylum seekers'' 
H2 Perceived (socio-economic and symbolic) threat will increase rejection of humanitarian policy 
measures toward asylum seekers 
H3 Rejection of humanitarian policy measures toward asylum seekers will be higher among 
individuals holding a right-wing political identification  
H4 The effect of the frame “asylum seekers” on rejection of humanitarian policy measures will 
decrease with increasing levels of perceived (socio-economic and symbolic) threat 
H5 The effect of the frame “asylum seekers” on rejection of humanitarian policy measures will be 
weaker among respondents holding a right-wing political identification 
Data and Method 
The current study is based on data we collected during the spring of 2013 among a representative stratified 
sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel (N =801).We used fully structured telephone-based 
interviews that included several attitudinal batteries commonly found in international surveys such as the 
ESS (European Social Survey)-ERIC and the ISSP (International Social Survey Program), as well as 
standard socio-demographic items relevant to the Israeli setting. Sampling was based on place of  
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residence (community) of the respondents, and respondents were drawn from a phone registry (mostly 
landline and a small number of cellular phone numbers) owned by Uniseker center, at the University of 
Haifa, who conducted the field work.
6
 
Respondents were randomly allocated into one of two questionnaires that were identical in all respects but 
the opening sentence and the reference group mentioned across all the attitudinal batteries. The first 
version began with the following sentence: “in recent years, people from various African countries have 
entered Israel via the Egyptian border, and asked for asylum for reasons of political persecution or civil 
war...” (N= 500). The opening sentence of the second version of the questionnaire was: “in recent years, 
people from various African countries have infiltrated Israel through the Egyptian border without any visa or 
permit, thus breaking the law.” (N = 301). These two questionnaire versions allow us to test the role of 
framing effects in the attitude formation process of the respondents (see e.g., Augoustinos and Quinn 2003; 
Kinder and Sanders 1990). The response rate was 50 %.
7
 The two samples were very similar in terms of 
socio-demographic characteristics allowing us to assume random assignment (see Table 1). 
To test our hypotheses, we applied OLS regression models (STATA 14.0
©
). The dependent variable in our 
study is disagreement with or rejection of humanitarian policy measures toward asylum seekers. It is 
composed of four items referring to policy measures that Israel should or should not implement toward 
asylum seekers. The items were “Israel should offer protection to individuals in trouble”; “asylum 
seekers/infiltrators should be allowed to work while their refugee application is being processed”; “Israel 
should provide asylum seekers/infiltrators financial assistance”; and “Government should be generous in 
accepting refugee applications”. Answers ranged from 1 “completely disagree” to 7 “completely agree.” 
Items were recoded so that the higher the value, the higher the disagreement with these policy measures. 
To test the content validity of this index, we first ran an exploratory factor analysis (principal component 
factoring) confirming that all four items load well on the theoretical construct with standardized factor 
loadings above 0.50. We then also ran a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 23.0
©
, to test 
the measurement invariance of the factors across the two framing subsamples (see standardized factor 
loadings in Appendix 1). As disclosed in Appendix 2, findings indicated a good fit of the independent model 
and scalar invariance (Chen 2007) which implies comparable structures of the latent variables (Milfont and 
Fischer 2010). 
Based on previous literature, we predicted that variation in responses to this battery of items would be 
positively correlated with perceived threat, referring both to competition and symbolic threat. In a second 
step we therefore constructed a measure for perceived threat (socio-economic and symbolic) including 
seven items referring to possible threats posed by asylum seekers. Sample items include “asylum 
seekers/infiltrators in Israel are a burden on the welfare services provided by the state to all residents”; 
“asylum seekers/infiltrators in Israel raise crime levels”; “asylum seekers/infiltrators take jobs away from 
Israelis”; and “asylum seekers/infiltrators pose a threat to my own or my family’s safety”. Answers ranged 
from 1 “completely disagree” to 7 “completely agree.” All seven items
                                                        
6 Comparing our own data to information published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, we found a significant 
over-representation of highly educated individuals in our sample. 
7 Non-response refers to individuals who refused to participate (384), those who postponed the interview several times 
(149), individuals who had difficulty answering the questions (232), and interviews that were not completed (24). 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the sample (only cases included in the analysis are included) 
 Infiltrators Asylum seekers 
Perceived threat   
Burden welfare system 5.62 (1.91) 5.68 (1.84) 
Burden education system 4.59 (2.24) 4.86 (2.17) 
Take jobs 4.18 (2.27) 4.59 (2.24) 
Lower wages 4.16 (2.16) 4.37 (2.18) 
Increases crime 5.47 (2.02) 5.74 (1.74) 
Threat to public health 4.59 (2.21) 4.84 (2.09) 
Threat to me and/or my family 4.27 (2.42) 4.46 (2.33) 
Exclusion from humanitarian rights   
Protect people in need 3.48 (2.17) 3.56 (2.11) 
Allow work while asylum in process 4.43 (2.41) 4.23 (2.38) 
Government generous in granting asylum 5.29 (1.89) 5.01 (2.00) 
Government provides financial assistance 5.31 (1.91) 5.11 (2.00) 
Controls   
Female 54.20 52.29 
Male 45.80 47.71 
Right/religious political identification 38.17 35.42 
Center 12.98 15.18 
Left 12.98 14.46 
Other 3.05 2.41 
No party 27.10 21.93 
Missing 5.34 9.88 
Israeli 22.52 22.17 
Mizrahi 31.68 33.25 
Ashkenazi 27.10 29.16 
FSU 17.18 13.01 
Mixed second generation 1.53 2.41 
No academic education 52.67 49.16 
Academic education 47.33 50.85 
Religious 52.67 50.84 
Secular 47.33 49.16 
Not employed 20.23 19.52 
Not employed and searching for a job 1.91 4.58 
Employed 77.86 75.90 
Native 66.41 72.05 
Immigrant 33.59 27.95 
Does not encounter in everyday life 28.24 38.07 
Encounter in everyday life 71.76 61.93 
Age 45.60 (14.18) 46.53 (14.59) 
N 262 415 
Differences significant at the 0.05 level are marked in italics  
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load well on one factor with all standardized factor loadings higher than 0.50 (see Appendix 2). Given that 
the scalar invariance reported above also applies for this factor we built a mean index composed of all 
seven items which we shall use in our OLS regression models. 
Political identification is determined according to respondents' self-reports on the party which best 
represents their political views. The parties were grouped according to right-wing, left-wing, center parties, 
and religious parties.
8
 To these groups, we added two additional categories: one for individuals who voted 
for parties that do not fall 
within the “left-right” scale (other) and another for individuals who reported that no party represents their 
political view (no party). The relatively high share of respondents (over 20 %) reporting to have no party 
which represents their political views is similar to that reported in the 2012 Israeli Democracy Index 
(Herman et al. 2012). 
Our model additionally controls for several sociodemographic properties of the respondents. We first 
included in the model information on the respondents' socio-economic position. Specifically, we control for 
their educational level (academic or not), and their employment status (employed, not employed or not 
employed and looking for a job). 
The respondents' religious affiliation was measured by the respondents' self-definition as ultra-orthodox, 
orthodox, traditional, or secular. Specifically we compared secular respondents with the rest. Ethnic group 
membership within the Jewish majority was measured with the usual categories: respondents born in Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, or who were born in Israel to a father born in these regions were coded 
“Mizrachi”; respondents born in Europe, the Americas or Oceania, or who were born in Israel to a father 
born in these regions were coded “Ashkenazi”; respondents who immigrated from the Former Soviet Union 
since 1989 were coded “FSU”; and respondents who were Israeli born to Israeli born parents were coded 
“Israeli”. Israeli born respondents to one parent born in Israel and another abroad were coded “mixed”. We 
also included a distinction between Israeli born respondents (0) and immigrants (1). 
Age was calculated from respondents' year of birth. Males (1) were differentiated from female respondents 
(0). In addition to these control variables and given that asylum seekers in Israel are not spread equally 
across different regions and cities, we control for whether or not respondents come across asylum seekers 
in their daily lives (come across = 1). 
Our hypotheses imply two moderation processes: one for the role of perceived threat in the relations 
between framing and rejection of humanitarian policy measures, and another for the role of right-wing 
political identification in these relations. We thus estimated additional models including first a two-way 
interaction between perceived threat and framing and second, a two-way interaction between right-wing 
political identification and framing. 
Findings 
Table 1 presents mean levels (standard deviations) of the indicators used to form the different constructs of 
perceived threat, and disagreement with humanitarian policy measures. The table indicates that our 
respondents feel threatened by asylum seekers.  
                                                        
8 Center parties were: Yesh Atid, Hatnua and Kadima, Left parties were: Avoda, Meretz and Hadash, Right parties were: 
Halikud, Habait Hayehudi, and Israel Beiteinu, Religious parties were: Shas and Yahadut Hatora 
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The mean levels of perceived threat among respondents exposed to the “asylum seekers” frame range 
between 4.37 for the lowering wages item and 5.74 for the crime related item (the scale ranges between 1 
and 7, where 7 means strongly agree). Looking at the “infiltrators” subgroup, the mean levels of perceived 
threat range from 4.16 for the lowering wages item, to 5.62 for the welfare threat item. Importantly, not all 
differences observed in the mean levels of perceived threat were statistically significant. Notably, 
respondents exposed to the “asylum seekers” frame reported significantly higher levels of perceived threat 
compared to those exposed to the “infiltrators” frame on four items: asylum seekers increase crime levels, 
asylum seekers threat public health, asylum seekers take jobs away from Israelis and asylum seekers are a 
burden on the education system. 
The respondents' mean levels of disagreement with humanitarian policy practices range between 3.56 
(asylum seekers subgroup) and 3.48 (infiltrators subgroup) for the protection item and 5 .11 (asylum 
seekers subgroup) and 5.31 (infiltrators subgroup) for the financial assistance item (identical scaling to the 
items measuring perceived threat). In the case of disagreement with humanitarian policy measures, the 
differences between the two frame subgroups were not statistically significant. 
The results of our estimated OLS regression models are presented in Table 2. Model 1 includes the framing 
manipulation (asylum seekers). Model 2 includes in addition our construct for perceived threat. Model 3 also 
includes a two-way interaction between perceived threat and the framing manipulation. Model 4 includes the 
two-way interaction between framing, and right-wing political identification. Unlike the previous models, 
here, the rest of the political identifications were grouped into one reference category. 
As indicated in Model 1, the framing manipulation was not statistically significant. The findings also indicate 
that individuals with a center or left political identification show lower levels of rejection of humanitarian 
policy measures compared with rightwing voters (b = -0.75 and -1.38, respectively, for center and left). 
Considering the long lasting cooperation between right-wing and religious parties in Israel, it is not 
surprising that no differences were found between respondents with a right-wing political identification and 
those identifying with religious parties. In model 4, we therefore included religious parties' voters under our 
definition of “right-wing” political identification.9 
Model 1 additionally conveyed that secular respondents show lower disagreement with humanitarian policy 
measures compared with traditional or orthodox as well as ultra-orthodox respondents (b = -0.35). We 
found no indication for any association between socio-economic status and attitudes toward humanitarian 
policy measures. The same is also true for ethnic background, and immigration background. Model 1 
explains some 18 % of the explained variance in the observed levels of rejection of humanitarian policy 
measures toward asylum seekers. 
Model 2 conveys that net of perceived threat, the effect of religious level is no longer significant. Perceived 
threat thus mediates the effect of religiosity. The regression coefficients for political identification are now 
smaller in size, but they still significantly  
                                                        
9 Differences between right-wing voters and the “other” category were also not significant, however this is a very small 
control category we would not like to over interpret. 
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Table 2 OLS regression coefficients (SE) predicting rejection of humanitarian policy measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
*
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Secular -0.35
**
 -0.17 -0.18 -0.28
*
 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Center party -0.75
***
 -0.54
**
 -0.53
**
  
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)  
Left party -1.38
***
 -0.86
***
 -0.83
***
  
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)  
Religious party 0.38 0.38 0.38  
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)  
Other party 0.07 0.07 0.09  
 (0.36) (0.34) (0.33)  
No party -0.40
*
 -0.30
*
 -0.28  
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)  
Missing on political identification -0.48
*
 -0.35 -0.34  
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)  
Not employed -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Not employed and looking for a job -0.01 -0.15 -0.18 -0.10 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) 
Academic degree -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Immigrant 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Ashkenazi -0.23 -0.18 -0.17 -0.21 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Mizrachi 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.06 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
FSU 1989+ 0.01 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Mixed Israeli -0.18 -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Contact 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Asylum seekers -0.06 -0.17 -0.81
*
 -0.27 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.33) (0.14) 
Perceived SE threat  0.34
***
 0.26
***
 0.38
***
 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Asylum seekers # perceived SE    0.13
*
  
threat     
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Table 2 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   (0.06)  
Right-wing/religious political id    0.36
*
 
    (0.18) 
Asylum seekers# right-wing/religious    0.19 
political id    (0.22) 
_cons 5.43
***
 3.66
***
 4.05
***
 3.27
***
 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.36) (0.31) 
R
2
 0.18 0.28 0.29 0.27 
N 677 677 677 677 
Standard errors in parentheses * p <0.05,** p <0.01,*** p < 0.001 
Reference categories: female; traditional, orthodox, or ultra orthodox; right-wing parties; employed; no 
academic degree; native born; Israeli; no contact; “infiltrators” 
account for differences in the respondents' attitudes regarding humanitarian policy measures (b = -0.54 and 
-0.86 for center and left, respectively). Another consequence of the insertion of perceived threat into the 
model is the increase in the strength of the framing coefficient that remains nonetheless insignificant (b = -
0.17). This change in the framing coefficient is in line with our expectation that perceived threat interacts 
with the framing indicator, a possibility we test in the next model. The coefficient of the perceived threat 
index is positive and significant implying, as expected, that perceived threat increases the respondents' 
disagreement with humanitarian policy measures (b = 0.34). The explained variance in model 2 rose to 28 
%, indicating the important role of perceived threat, or costs to self, in the formation of attitudes regarding 
humanitarian policy measures toward asylum seekers. 
Model 3 tested the hypothesis that the framing effect will decrease as levels of perceived threat increase. In 
order to test this hypothesis we inserted an interaction term between the frame (“asylum seekers” = 1) and 
perceived threat. The findings of the model support our assumption that the frame and perceived threat 
interact with each other. First, the coefficient of the interaction term is significant and positive (b =0.13). 
Second, looking at the coefficients for the “asylum seekers” frame (b = -0.81) and for perceived threat (b = 
0.26), we can conclude that in line with our hypothesis, the framing effect decreases with increasing levels 
of perceived threat. As demonstrated in Fig. 1, the framing effect is relatively large and significant when 
values of perceived threat are below 4 (the middle category). 
Model 4 included the two-way interaction between the “asylum seekers” frame and political identification (1 
= right-wing or religious political identification and 0 = all the rest). The findings presented in column 4 
demonstrate that here, our hypothesis is only partially supported by the data. The coefficient of the 
interaction term was not significant at the 0.05 level, and the coefficient of the framing effect was only 
marginally significant. Yet, the direction of these coefficients indicates that the negative effect of the frame 
“asylum seekers” on rejection of humanitarian policy measures, decreases for respondents holding a right-
wing political identification. As demonstrated in Fig. 2, the marginal effect of the “asylum seekers” frame for 
individuals with a right-  
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Fig. 1 Contrasts of predictive margins of asylum seekers with 95 % CIs 
religious political identification on rejection of humanitarian policy measures is not significant. The effect of 
the asylum seekers frame for other respondents is borderline significant and larger. Both the effect of 
perceived threat and of right-wing political identification were significant and in the expected direction (b = 
0.38 and 0.36, respectively, for perceived threat and for right-wing or religious political identification). 
 
 
Fig. 2 Contrasts of predictive margins of asylum seekers with 95 % CIs 
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Conclusions 
This study investigated attitudes toward asylum seekers in Israel, where asylum seekers 
are framed in the public discourse as “infiltrators”, a negatively loaded definition previously used in the 
context of persons suspected of committing acts of terror. We specifically investigated the extent to which 
the Jewish Israeli public agrees with the current policy toward asylum seekers and thus disagrees with 
implementing humanitarian policy measures towards them. Our hypotheses were first, that respondents 
exposed to the “asylum seekers” frame will show weaker disagreement with humanitarian policy measures 
due to the considerations this frame implies. Second, we predicted that disagreement with humanitarian 
policy measures will be positively correlated with perceived threat and with a right-wing political 
identification. We further hypothesized that the framing effect will be moderated by these two factors that 
are associated with the respondents' motivation to take into account new considerations associated with the 
“asylum seekers” frame when forming their policy-related attitudes. 
Our first hypothesis, which assumed a direct framing effect, was refuted. Mean levels of (dis)agreement with 
items referring to the implementation of humanitarian policy measures toward asylum seekers were very 
similar between the two framing subgroups. In our first regression model (model 1), the effect of framing 
was also insignificant. Our findings do imply that perceived threat intervenes in the relations between the 
frame, and the respondents' attitudes on humanitarian policy measures. In line with our hypothesis, we find 
that the effect of the frame on rejection of humanitarian policy measures weakens as levels of perceived 
threat increase. 
This latter finding supports the assumption regarding the existence of a tension between humanitarian 
attitudes and self-interests or costs. As levels of perceived threat increase, the sensitivity of the respondents 
to the circumstances associated with the arrival of asylum seekers decreases. The findings thus imply that a 
change of the frame may elicit change in public attitudes; however, for this change to occur action must be 
taken to reduce levels of perceived threat associated with asylum seekers in Israel. 
Our hypothesis regarding the moderating role of political identification in the relations between framing and 
the rejection of humanitarian policy measures was only partially supported. Although the findings are in the 
expected direction, they do not reach statistical significance. With the necessary caution, we can conclude 
that our study provides support for the idea that individuals need to demonstrate their in-group prototypical 
behavior. This need expresses itself in the “blind” acceptance of the frame adopted by prototypical ingroup 
members (in this case political representatives). In comparison to individuals whose in-group prototypical 
behavior does not imply exclusion of asylum seekers, those who identify with the political right in Israel were 
less sensitive to the alternative frame they were offered and the alternative considerations it implies. 
There are a few directions further research could follow to learn more about the processes discussed here: 
first, different frames should be tested. It is possible that the weak evidence we found for the framing effect 
derives from our use of the term “asylum seekers” which is a complex legal term. An alternative frame 
would be “refugees”. In the Israeli case one needs to be aware of the fact that this word implies other 
complexities associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and with the Holocaust. Future studies could try 
to disentangle this issue. Second, the tension between humanitarian attitudes and self- or group interests 
should be tested inter-culturally in order to gain more validity.  
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Future studies will also gain from the integration of better measures of humanitarian attitudes, and 
particularly, humanitarian values (e.g., Schwartz 2007). The same holds for perceived threat. Finally, our 
conclusions are based on a model which does not cover the entire scope of mechanisms explaining the 
exclusion of foreigners. For example, we did not inquire about the role of psychological traits, or of values. 
In this study, we show that presenting asylum seekers in a humanitarian light, emphasizing their flight and 
fear of persecution in their countries of origin (the frame “asylum seekers”) does not dramatically change 
public perceptions regarding the way the state should treat them. The findings are in line with the literature 
suggesting that the asylum seekers discourse in host states is one characterized by a costs-responsibility 
nexus. Our case study indicates that the attitudes of the Israeli public are shaped mostly by the former. 
Appendix 1 
Table 3 Standardized factor loadings from the MGCFA 
 
Infiltrators Asylum 
seekers 
Perceived threat indicators   
Burden Social Security system 0.66 0.68 
Burden Education system 0.66 0.71 
Take jobs away 0.60 0.62 
Lower wages 0.57 0.59 
Increase crime 0.66 0.71 
Threat to public health 0.69 0.70 
Threat to personal security 0.56 0.60 
Policy attitudes   
Israel should protect individuals in need 0.54 0.56 
Asylum seekers/infiltrators should be allowed to work while their  0.71 0.71 
application is considered   
Government should be generous in granting refugee status 0.78 0.82 
Government should provide financial assistance 0.53 0.53 
Appendix 2 
Table 4 Fit measures 
 
Unconstrained model Measurement weights model Measurement intercepts model 
R
2
/DF 2.48 2.41 2.46 
CFI 0.98 0.98 0.97 
RMSEA 0.035 0.034 0.035 
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